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Abstract 
‘Flex crops’ such as corn, oil palm and soy are understood to have multiple, interchangeable uses; 
they have material flexibility. We propose that discursive flexibility – the ability to strategically 
switch between discourses to promote an objective – equally shapes the political economy of flex 
crops and thereby patterns of agrarian and environmental change. Comparing oil palm and 
Jatropha curcas, we find that actors who cast oil palm as a multi-scale solution to food and 
energy insecurity, climate change and (rural) poverty successfully reinforce its high material 
flexibility. Jatropha’s proponents compensate for low material flexibility by positioning the crop 
as a ‘sustainable’ energy source that achieves both global and local goals. While this paper 
focuses on discourses that reinforce the oil palm and jatropha projects, understanding the power 
of discursive maneuvering can also inform efforts to contest them. 
Key words: Flex crops; oil palm; Jatropha curcas; agrarian and environmental change; 
discursive flexibility; discourse 
Introduction 
Major changes in land use, control and rights are being driven in many parts of the world 
by the expansion of corn, sugarcane, soybean and oil palm (Kaag and Zoomers 2014, 
Cotula 2013). These are what Borras et al. call ‘flex crops’ – their produce can have 
‘multiple uses (food, feed, fuel and industrial material) that can be easily and flexibly 
inter-changed’ (2012, 851). Investors are thought to be attracted to such material 
flexibility because it lets them decide what to produce and sell based on price signals, 
thus diversifying markets for their investment while dealing with a single crop (Borras et 
al. 2014).  
While materialist explanations of crop flexibility are very important to understanding the 
political economy of contemporary agrarian and environmental change, we think they can 
be further enhanced by examining the shifting and interacting discourses around these 
flex crops. Indeed, these are usually not presented as ‘crops’ at all, but rather as means of 
achieving food and energy security, climate change mitigation, economic development, 
enhanced (rural) livelihoods and even improved governance at multiple places 1  and 
scales.2 Conversely, for some actors flex crops embody multiple threats to food security, 
climate change and variability and to the livelihoods and human rights of peasants, 
pastoralists, fisher-folks and indigenous peoples. In addition to a material type of 
 
1 Broadly understood as a ´unit of space that has discrete boundaries, shared internal characteristics, and 
that changes over time and interacts with other similar units´ (Gregory et al. 2009, 539)  
2 Scale ´comprises the nested (and sometimes not so nested) hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing size´ 
(Jessop 2007, 104-5) 
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flexibility, then, flex crops are subject to what we call ‘discursive flexibility’ – the ability 
to strategically switch among multiple discourses which construe the necessary meanings 
and representations to achieve an objective.  
We argue that acknowledging and exploring the discursive dimension of flex crops’ 
flexibility can help to move beyond the analysis of the contemporary political economy 
of agriculture, land and resource control to that of their very politics. Indeed, ‘beliefs, 
ideological controls and discursive practices, as well as negotiated systems of meaning, 
shape all forms of access [to resources]’ (Ribot and Peluso 2003: 168). Discursive 
flexibility is both a vector and an expression of contentious politics around flex crop 
cultivation, processing, circulation and consumption across different places and scales 
and through time. As we will discuss, these crops mean different – even completely 
opposite – things to different subjects, and even different things to the same subject under 
changing circumstances.  
This is not to say that material flexibility only influences materialist outcomes of flex 
crops and discursive flexibility just ideational ones. The relationship is rather a co-
constitutive one. Building on the ideational-material stream, Jessop’s concept of 
‘economic imaginaries’ (2005) is very relevant to our approach to flex crops as economic 
objects in the making. He understands economic imaginaries as ‘imaginatively narrated, 
more or less coherent subsets of [economic] activities [that] identify, privilege and seek 
to stabilize some economic activities from the totality of economic relations and 
transform them into objects of observation, calculation and governance’ (2005, 145). As 
such, Jessop argues about the need to ‘not only study changing discourses but also the 
mechanisms and material practices through which visions, projects and strategies are 
realized’ (2005, 161). This provides a basis for our hunch that discursive maneuvering 
plays a central role in shaping not only the ideological-political but also the economic 
possibilities for flex crops – for example, by shaping regulation as well as demand, and 
therefore the very price signal. More broadly, we follow the precedent of Bourdieu 
(1994), Hall et al. (2012), Ribot and Peluso (2003), Li (2014), Tsing (2000) and Igoe 
(2010) in exploring the influence of the ideological field of contestation – whose main 
mechanisms of struggle are discourses – over resource control. We argue that material 
and discursive flexibility mutually influence both material and ideational outcomes of 
flex crops, and that they interact in multiple ways (e.g. reinforcing, compensating, 
amplifying or complementing each other).  
Here we focus on how legitimating discourses have been used to ward off criticism of 
particular flex crops. Monoculture, high-input plantations have been roundly attacked for 
their ecological consequences and their impacts on land rights, livelihoods and labour, 
particularly through recent critical scholarship on land grabs (among many others, see 
White et al. 2012, Li 2011, Borras et al. 2011, Cotula 2012). Meanwhile the drive to 
produce biofuels from agricultural crops has attracted its own set of critiques, 
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prominently featuring the themes of food security and climate change (Franco et al. 2010, 
German, Schoneveld, and Pacheco 2011, Creutzig et al. 2013). Critics have asserted that 
agrofuel production diverts food crops for fuel, competes with food production for 
irrigation water, draws down grain reserves, and pushes up food prices (Brown 2007, 
Ogg 2009, La Via Campesina 2009). Jean Ziegler, then the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, declared agrofuel production a ‘crime against 
humanity’ because of its alleged contribution to hunger (Ferrett 2007). Research on land 
use change has also found that far from reducing greenhouse gas emissions, under many 
circumstances biofuel production incurs a ‘carbon debt’ that actually worsens carbon 
emissions in the short- to medium-term (Searchinger et al. 2008, Fargione, Hill, et al. 
2008). In the face of these attacks on the legitimacy of large-scale land deals and biofuel 
production, actors who are invested in flex crop projects have strong incentive to 
reinforce positive discourses about their activities.  
In this article we examine the discourses that state, corporate and social actors employ to 
legitimate the expansion of oil palm and Jatropha curcas (hereafter jatropha), how these 
discourses are activated in a way that shows discursive flexibility, and consider how 
discursive flexibility interacts with the material (in)flexibility of these crops. We aim, 
then, to explore the politics across and within multiple actors supporting oil palm and 
jatropha in different ways and for different reasons. We discuss how meaning-making 
discourses are strategically formed, signified and activated through a range of 
mechanisms with the result that material and discursive flexibilities complement and 
reinforce each other in the case of oil palm, while discursive flexibility compensates for 
the lower material flexibility of jatropha. It is our belief that revealing how control over 
discourse plays out as a form of strategic power can inform efforts not only to 
understand, but also to counter, current patterns of agrarian change. 
Oil palm as a response-able phenomenon 
Today, it is possible to say that oil palm has fully joined the global league of dominant 
commodity crops. Not only has oil palm increased its world acreage threefold between 
1993 and 2012 to reach almost to eighteen million hectares, but also and most 
distinctively, the gross production value of its main commodity so far, crude palm oil, 
increased more than eightfold in the same period to stand for more than forty one billion 
US$ by 2012 (FAOSTAT, accessed on 11-12-2014). And the industry is confident this 
growth will endure and Oil World foresees a solid 5% annual growth on palm oil 
production, to reach 78 million tons in 20203. In 2011, 48% of the world palm oil was 
produced in Indonesia, 38% in Malaysia and 14% in the rest of the world. Among the 
 
3 RSPO Technical Director in First Latin American Conference of Oil Palm Growers, Guatemala, October 17 2013. 
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world’s top ten palm oil producing countries, excluding Indonesia and Malaysia, five of 
them are in Latin America and the rest in Asia and Africa4. 
One of the keys to oil palm’s success within current world historic politico-economic 
conditions has to do with its increasing multiple uses among which investors can flex 
(Alonso-Fradejas et al. 2015). There are already many uses for palm oil in the food, fuel, 
feed and consumer goods industries. And still, according to oil palm industry 
representatives, ‘we are using just around 5% of the many potential uses of palm oil 
which also include plastics and polymers, paper and so on’5. Besides these multiple uses 
associated with palm oil there is a ‘second generation’ of uses associated with oil palm’s 
biomass processing in bio-refineries. Indeed, oil palm bio-refineries allow for an 
increasing number of uses in the energy, biofuels and bio-chemicals sectors (Loh and 
Choo 2013, Hassan and Shirai 2013). This is what we describe in Figure 1 below as ‘all 
uses for oil palm’. Thus, a traditional value chain analysis is not fully apt to capture the 
technological, economic and political dynamics, and their manifold interrelations, which 
shape the flexing among all these multiple uses of oil palm. This is why we adopt here for 
analytical purposes the ‘value web’ approach as elaborated by Borras et al. (2014), 
following Virchow et al.,  
In which the ‘web perspective’ is used as a multi-dimensional methodology to understand 
the interrelation between several value chains, to explore synergies and to identify 
inefficiencies in the entire biomass sector [...] The web perspective focuses on the 
numerous alternative uses of raw products, including recycling processes and the 
cascading effects during the processing phase of the biomass utilization’ (2014, n.p. stress 
added). 
The oil palm value web could be understood as the dynamic materialization of the 
economic imaginary of oil palm as a flex crop ‘grounded both in an “imagined economic 
space” and an “imagined community of economic interest” among diverse social forces’ 
(Jessop 2005, 160). Different type of corporations are the main actors in the oil palm 
value web, though there are also multiple state and social actors around it, with varying 
positionings towards oil palm or any of its multiple uses.  
The material flexibility of oil palm is associated with a series of legitimating discourses 
that Borras et al. (2014) call the ‘flex policy narratives by governments and corporations’. 
In the case of oil palm, these flex narratives abound basically on the virtues of its multiple 
uses with regards to food security, climate change mitigation, and (economic) 
development. This is what we describe in Figure 1 below as ‘oil palm for all purposes’. 
 
 
4 RSPO Technical Director in First Latin American Conference of Oil Palm Growers, Guatemala, October 17 2013. 
5 Executive Director of Guatemala’s Oil Palm Growers Guild -GREPALMA- in First Latin American Conference of 
Oil Palm Growers, Guatemala, October 18 2013. 
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Figure 1: Oil palm’s discursive web  
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
We suggest that the impact of such flex narratives is multiplied when actors in and 
around the oil palm’s value web switch strategically among them to construe the 
appropriate representations of oil palm, and meanings for its multiple uses, according to 
the ideological-political character of the interlocutor. In other words, the material 
flexibility of oil palm is further endowed with meaning when its multiple representations 
and use-meanings are activated in a way that shows discursive flexibility.  
We will discuss how discursive flexibility works for oil palm with examples from the two 
world top producers of the crop, Indonesia and Malaysia, and from the main producing 
countries in Latin America, namely Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras and Guatemala. 
Exploring the discursive flexibility oil palm in Latin America is interesting because, 
while the crop is neither new nor as longstanding as in South East Asia, it is definitely 
booming. Industry representatives from our four selected countries in this region 6 
declared in 2013 they all foresee oil palm acreage to keep increasing in the future at no 
less than last decade’s 10% average annual growth. And the World Bank states that ‘as 
much as 46% of the world’s potential area of non-forested, non-protected land, close to 
market, most suitable for oil palm under rainfed cultivation is in Latin America and The 
Caribbean’ (Fisher and Shah 2010 in Deininger et al. 2011).  
 
 
6 Those are the Colombian Federation of Oil Palm Growers (FEDEPALMA, in its Spanish acronym), the Ecuadorian 
National Association of Oil Palm Growers (ANCUPA), the Guatemalan Oil Palm Growers Guild (GREPALMA) and 
the Honduran National Federation of Oil Palm Growers (FENAPALMA).   
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Legitimating discourses around oil palm 
As we advanced, the main legitimating discourses for oil palm spin around the 
contributions of its multiple uses to three interrelated realms of great societal concern: 
food security, climate change mitigation, and (economic) development. A detailed 
examination of the three legitimating discourses is beyond our possibilities here. Rather, 
we focus on empirical examples that can help to put forward an initial discussion about 
who says what, why, to whom, where and when. 
Oil palm is the champion of the oilseeds to feed the world  
Food insecurity is one of the most controversial issues the actors in and around the oil 
palm value web have to deal with, especially when questioned with the ‘food vs. fuel’ 
and the ‘land-grabbing’ critiques. In dealing with such critiques, these actors have often 
recurred to two mutually reinforcing narratives. First, they elaborate on a discourse aimed 
at representing oil palm as food. This is especially the case when favorable state, 
corporate and social actors raise public alert about the need to increase food production to 
feed a growing world population7. Following a neo-Malthusian argumentative thread, 
they aim to push through the idea that ‘large-scale agro-industrial projects are the answer 
to food insecurity in the country and worldwide [thus], thus, public policies should 
consider this reality’.8 Often seeking legitimation in the ‘spectacular’ figures (Li 2014) 
carefully selected from reports by the World Bank, FAO, UNEP and other international 
financial and governance organizations (IFIs&IGOs), industry representatives from Latin 
America stress that 150 million tons more of edible oil need to be produced to feed the 
world by 20509.   
Secondly, oil palm’s representation as food is enhanced when promoted as the fittest of 
all oilseeds to fill the gap on the needed amount of edible oil. Palm oil is argued to be ‘a 
perfect substitute for mild vegetable oils, like soybean or sunflower oil, which are subject 
to a process of partial hydrogenation to give them more stability which damages human 
health’. 10  Furthermore, and turning once again to spectacular figures, industry 
representatives argue that in order to achieve those extra 150 million tons of edible oil 
worldwide ‘it would be necessary to plant 333 million hectares with soy, or 217 million 
 
7 These include the Colombian FEDEPALMA’s President (in XVII International Conference on Palm Oil in Colombia, 
September 26-28 2012), the Ecuadorian ANCUPA’s Executive Director, and the Guatemalan GREPALMA’s President 
(in I Latin American Conference of Oil Palm Growers, Guatemala, October 18 2013). But also the Agriculture Director 
of WWF-US, and the Executive Director for Central America and the Caribbean of CropLife, an international 
organization representing Bayer CropScience, FMC, Syngenta, Basf, Sumitomo Chemical, DuPont, Dow 
AgroSciences, Monsanto and Arysta LifeScience (http://www.croplifela.org), both in the 4th Latin American 
Conference of the RSPO, Honduras, August 8 2013. 
8 Guatemalan GREPALMA’s President, in First Latin American Conference of Oil Palm Growers, Guatemala, October 
17 2013. 
9 In First Latin American Conference of Oil Palm Growers, Guatemala, October 18 2013 
10 Guatemalan GREPALMA’s Executive Director in http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/aceite_de_palma-
primer_productor_mundial-cultivo_0_1018098334.html accessed on October 29 2013 
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hectares with rapeseed but only 36.5 million hectares with oil palm’.11 Thus, ‘oil palm 
saves land’ because ‘using only 1% of the world’s total farmland it provides 30% of all 
vegetable oils: Oil palm is more oil in less land’.12 
Oil palm is green energy to cool the planet 
The virtues of oil palm to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and mitigate climate 
change can adopt multiple narratives. Among the most common ones are those that 
elaborate on the environmental benefits of oil palm itself, palm oil and oil palm’s 
biomass. 
Thus, oil palm can be sometimes presented by the industry as a ‘tropical tree’,13 arguing 
that ‘the life environment created by an oil palm forest is very positive for climate change 
mitigation’,14 and that oil palm plantations ‘have reduced vulnerability to natural disasters 
and avoided soil erosion due to floods’ (Grepalma 2012a, 4).  
Besides, one of the major uses of palm oil today keeps being that of feedstock for 
biodiesel. As stated in 2013 by the governmental Malaysian Palm Oil Board, the 
‘development of green fuels will contribute significantly to reduction of GHG emissions 
and mitigate climate change’ (Loh and Choo 2013, 12). This is supported by the 
Secretary General of the Colombian FEDEPALMA who even provides figures to argue 
that ‘palm oil biodiesel greenhouse gasses emissions are between 83 and 108% lower 
than those from fossil fuel diesel’.15 According to different IGOs working with Latin 
American governments in the development and enactment of biofuel substitution 
mandates, palm oil is the most efficient feedstock for first generation biodiesel (Horta 
Nogueira 2004, Reyes et al. 2010). Once again oil palm is portrayed as the best of all 
oilseeds – this time as a biodiesel feedstock. 
However, the GHG emissions reduction possibilities associated to palm oil do not stop 
with biodiesel. The methane produced by palm oil mill effluent (POME) is often captured 
by covering open POME disposal lagoons with a geo-membrane. This is a technique 
straddling the traditional oil palm mill and the more recent oil palm bio-refinery. While 
the former is mainly focused on palm oil extraction, the latter is thought to further 
explore the ‘green energy’ generation possibilities associated with palm oil and especially 
oil palm’s abundant biomass, namely fronds, trunks, empty fruit bunches, mesocarp fiber 
and palm kernel shell (Hassan and Shirai 2013). As the President of the Colombian 
 
11 Guatemalan GREPALMA’s President in First Latin American Conference of Oil Palm Growers, Guatemala, October 
17 2013, stress added 
12 Latin American industry representatives in First Latin American Conference of Oil Palm Growers, Guatemala, 
October 17-18 2013, stress added 
13 Guatemalan GREPALMA’s Executive Director in I Latin American Conference of Oil Palm Growers, Guatemala 
October 18 2013 
14 Colombian FEDEPALMA’s President in I Latin American Conference of Oil Palm Growers, Guatemala October 18 
2013, stress added 
15 Interview in Bogotá, September 20 2013 
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FEDEPALMA argued at the XVII International Conference on Palm Oil in Colombia, on 
September 26 2012: 
The possibility of producing second generation biofuels out of oil palm’s biomass, and 
the use of its byproducts and residues to generate electricity and mitigate greenhouse 
gasses show that our business has an important potential for energy generation which is 
still very little exploited.  
Indeed, in the article issued on May 27 2014 by the Indonesian Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resources about the bioenergy potential in Indonesia, one of the key messages 
for oil palm’s biomass is that ‘processing the waste is generally like a problem that turned 
into a blessing’ (ESDM n.d.). In Malaysia, where bio-refineries are operative already, the 
government affirms that ‘the oil palm industry plays an important role in supporting the 
nation’s energy requirement in transportation, electricity and industrial sectors’ (Loh and 
Choo 2013, 12). 
Oil palm is a driver of responsible and sustainable development 
On September 26 2012, the President of Colombia addressed the participants and the 
media at the XVII International Conference on Palm Oil in the following terms: ‘we need 
to make of oil palm a source of “opportunities, progress and development”, as this year’s 
conference slogan states […] in this way -you and us- will be contributing to a better 
world’ (Presidencia de la República de Colombia 2012). In a similar line, the President of 
the Guatemalan GREPALMA finished his inauguration speech at the First Latin 
American Conference of Oil Palm Growers in Guatemala, on October 17 2013, by 
stressing that: ‘we firmly believe that supporting sustainability conditions for the crop 
and the eco-industry of oil palm means contributing to the country’s formal economy and 
thus to real development, prosperity and the wellbeing of the families from the rural areas 
where we are present’ (stress added).  
These messages present oil palm as a ‘development driver’. While there is nothing new 
about accumulation projects represented as developmental, the qualifications of oil palm 
as a socially and ecologically responsible project are very telling of the ‘pretty-up 
strategy’ to resignify oil palm from a hazard to a blessing (Alonso-Fradejas 2015). In so 
doing, ‘sustainability gatekeepers’ (Alonso-Fradejas 2015) play a fundamental role. They 
are championed by big development and environmental (inter)national NGOs which are 
part and parcel of corporate social responsibility (CSR) certification schemes around the 
oil palm value web, most distinctively the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) 
and the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials (RSB). Sustainability gatekeepers ‘pretty 
up’ oil palm by resignifying major social and ecological concerns around oil palm as 
responsible and sustainable. For instance, the Dutch NGO Solidaridad promotes inclusion 
of small land-holders as contract farmers (Solidaridad Network n.d.) as a way to twist the 
land-grabbing problem associated with oil palm expansion, which they understand only 
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happens when people are physically expelled from their land. And regarding the 
ecological issues raised by oil palm plantations, the Vice-President of WWF-USA 
suggests that ‘when done right, oil palm can be carbon positive, improve biodiversity, and 
improve livelihoods’.16 Certification by any of these roundtables has become, indeed, an 
imperative, at least for those actors in the oil palm value web who want to keep on 
supplying western transnational corporations. For instance, many companies involved in 
production, circulation and retailing of consumer goods, some depicted in Figure 2 
below, have made public their commitment to buy only RSPO-certified palm oil from 
2015 onwards. 
Figure 2: Companies involved in production, circulation and retailing of consumer goods 
with palm oil which committed to buy only RSPO-Certified palm oil from 2015 onwards   
 
Source: Colombian FEDEPALMA’s President presentation in XVII International Conference on Palm Oil 
in Colombia, September 26, 2012. 
In spite of certification being a major trend, 82% of the palm oil produced in the world 
remains uncertified by RSPO (RSPO 2015). 17  This is considered a threat, by some 
corporate players, and an opportunity by others. On one side, representatives from 
Unilever, AHOLD and Nutreco questioned the validity and global scope of these 
commodity certification schemes if only transnational companies like theirs call suppliers 
 
16 In 4th Latin American Conference of the RSPO in Honduras, August 8 2013, stress added  
17 According to a Unilever representative, ‘only 30 out of the 500 palm oil companies or so in Indonesia are RSPO 
certified’. In meeting on “Certification and beyond: solutions for responsible agro-commodity governance”, organized 
by the “Ecosystem Alliance” (IUCN Netherlands, Wetlands International and Both Ends), October 30 2014, The 
Hague, The Netherlands. 
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to certify while large importers in China and India do not18. On the other side, some 
corporate actors in the oil palm value web see the question of ‘sustainability’ as a 
potential source of competitive advantages. As stated by the Secretary General of the 
Honduran FENAPALMA, ‘in Africa and Asia large forest and high ecological value 
areas have been deforested to expand oil palm plantations while in Honduras we use 
abandoned lands previously dedicated to large scale banana cultivation and cattle 
ranching’ (Agrytec 2011), while arguing elsewhere that ‘we can reach faster and cheaper 
(to the USA and the EU) through the Atlantic, being lucky that Honduran palm oil is seen 
as sustainable and with attributes the Asian one lacks’ (ICEX n.d.). This seems to be a 
condition shared among other major oil palm producing countries in Latin America. 
According to the president of the Colombian FEDEPALMA:  
Oil palm industry development of our world leader, Indonesia, is underpinned by cheap 
labor force, low production costs and large swathes of land given under concession and 
other forms by the government. But those conditions are neither easy to find somewhere 
else, especially in Latin America, nor sustainable. Thus, oil palm agroindustry must build 
and consolidate competitive advantages over more solid bases19.    
The latter statement is further backed by the Environmental Leader of FEDEPALMA, 
who argues that ‘the Malaysian and Indonesian oil palm sectors’ problems have been 
generalized to Latin America’. 20  In the face of such perceived stigmatization, the 
Secretary General of FEDEPALMA suggests that ‘this is why we need to certify under 
RSPO, to have a competitive advantage over Asian palm oil exporters. We do not 
advance the agrarian frontier’.21 
Oil palm’s discursive flexibility in action 
As argued before, legitimating narratives by actors in and around the oil palm value web 
are much more effective when activated in a flexible fashion. Preliminarily, we identify 
two major and interrelated ways in which the discursive flexibility of oil palm is 
activated; namely, the selective representation of oil palm; and the strategic choice of oil 
palm’s use-discourses. 
Way one: selective representation of oil palm 
The discursive flexibility of oil palm works this way by re-naming oil palm as different 
‘things’. In this way, a whole set of narratives are mobilized in the making of the 
particular identity of oil palm that the concerned actor needs to achieve its objectives. We 
 
18 At the meeting “Certification and beyond: solutions for responsible agro-commodity governance”, organized by the 
“Ecosystem Alliance”, October 30 2014, The Hague, The Netherlands. 
19 President of Colombian FEDEPALMA in XVII International Conference on Palm Oil in Colombia, September 26-28 
2012 
20 Colombian FEDEPALMA’s Environmental Leader in 4th Latin American Conference of the RSPO, Honduras, 
August 8 2013 
21 Interview with Colombian FEDEPALMA’s Secretary general in Bogotá, September 20 2013 
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have identified three main ‘identities’ for oil palm, that is, as a crop, as a tree and as a 
commodity. 
Oil palm is represented as an agricultural crop when the objective is to either support the 
discourse on its abilities to feed the world, or that related to its contributions to 
sustainable development. It is indeed a way of de-constructing and countering the critics 
about food crops substitution by expanding oil palm plantations. Beyond denying time 
and again that the expansion of oil palm plantations has led to staples’ substitution in 
Latin America, we discussed how industry representatives, together with a cohort of 
(inter)national consultants, state actors, NGOs and academics, present oil palm as the 
fittest of all oilseeds to provide the required edible oil to feed a growing world 
population, while saving land and generating employment and export revenues. Besides, 
and although this is much more emphasized in the case of jatropha, it is also often argued 
that oil palm is fit to grow in degraded soils.22  
Oil palm is also presented as tree, and accordingly, oil palm plantations as a forest with a 
large source of biomass, when the aim is to fully exploit the discourse on the benefits of 
oil palm to green energy generation and climate change mitigation. In dealing with 
accusations of deforestation, the Honduran FENAPALMA argued in 2009 that ‘a hectare 
of oil palm produces 20 tons of oxygen, that is, more than a hectare of tropical forest 
because oil palms are sown with specific distances among themselves to avoid 
competition, which is not the case of the forest’ (in Ríos 2009, 41, stress added). 
And finally, oil palm can be generically presented as a commodity feeding multiple 
intermediate and end uses. This is especially so when there is a need to circumvent 
representations of oil palm that hinder its abilities to circulate freely. Most distinctively, 
at the World Trade Organization (WTO) oil palm’s representations as a food crop and a 
tree are covered up under its multiple products/uses as an industrial good. In this way, 
trade of oil palm’s multiple uses can be negotiated as industrial goods in the WTO instead 
of being subject to the more restrictive provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
Another example is that ‘when looking at the ingredients on packages of products 
containing palm oil, dozens of aliases rather than “palm oil” are printed there’ (Alonso-
Fradejas et al. 2015). But it is also the case that oil palm is presented by industry 
representatives as a commodity, and most distinctively, as a valuable and flexible one, 
when the goal is to ‘trap’ a wide spectrum of investors in its value web, ranging from 
financial and other corporate investors to other non-corporate investors like contract-
farmers (see Borras et al. 2014, Alonso-Fradejas et al. 2015). 
 
 




Way two: strategic choice of oil palm’s use-discourses 
The discursive flexibility of oil palm works this way on the basis of two discursive 
strategies, namely the conflation of oil palm’s use-discourses, and the strategic 
dissociation from oil palm’s use-discourses. 
Discursive strategy 1: conflation of oil palm’s use-discourses  
This strategy entails the simultaneous use of narratives related to two or all of the three 
types of oil palm legitimating discourses discussed above. This is arguably the most 
common way in which the discursive flexibility of oil palm is activated and, as such, 
examples abound across geographies and actors. Two meaningful examples may suffice 
here to make the point. One is reflected in article 1 of the 2012 ‘Decree 1303 on the 
Production and Marketing of Biodiesel in Ecuador’, which states: 
Biofuel development in the country is to be declared of national interest as a means to 
promote the agricultural sector. Biofuel production, use and consumption will respond to 
an inclusive rural development strategy, protecting food sovereignty and environmental 
sustainability. (Government of Ecuador 2012 stress added)   
The other example can be found in the statement by leading technocrats from the 
Malaysian Palm Oil Board about how ‘Malaysia and the oil palm industry have a huge 
potential to become producer for RE [reduced emissions] besides producing oil to feed 
the world’ (Loh and Choo 2013, 12, stress added). 
The maximum expression of this discursive strategy 1 is when oil palm is resignified 
from a thing (a crop/tree/commodity) to a ‘response-able’ phenomenon. This entails the 
making of a meta-narrative that goes beyond the particular discourses elaborating on the 
benefits of oil palm for different purposes, to make of oil palm ‘the answer’23 to food and 
climate and development problems. The strategic resignification of oil palm as a 
response-able phenomenon is arguably a response to the overwhelming critique of oil 
palm expansion, meaningfully synthetized by the Vice-President of WWF-USA during 
the 4th Latin American Conference of the RSPO, when he suggested that ‘currently palm 
oil is the most controversial of all the globally traded commodities: Access to market and 
license to operate being seriously questioned’ (in Honduras, August 8 2013). 
Discursive strategy 2: strategic dissociation from oil palm’s use-discourses 
This works by choosing strategically whichever one, or two, of the three types of 
legitimating use-discourses serve better their purpose, and then covering up, distancing 
from, or even denying the other one, or two, discourses and associated uses. This is not as 
 




usual as the previous strategy, but it is especially useful to circumvent unsurmountable 
critique.  
An example of how some legitimating discourses are overtly embraced while others are 
buried, can be found in the narratives around biofuel regulations. For instance, even 
though biofuel regulations in Colombia and Guatemala were originally thought by policy 
makers as a means to reduce dependence on increasingly expensive fossil fuels24, such 
intention is buried in actual bills and policies which instead emphasize the benefits of 
biofuels production over agricultural growth and employment, and global climate change 
mitigation without compromising national food production.  
The maximum expression of this discursive strategy occurs when the material flexibility 
of oil palm is purportedly denied. For example, the Guatemalan Oil Palm Growers 
Association (GREPALMA) argues time and again that their palm oil is intended to feed 
the world and not fuel tanks. They not only denied the use of palm oil to produce 
biodiesel in Guatemala but they go further to argue that ‘oil palm contributes to the 
strengthening of the edible oil industry and thus to food sovereignty’ (Grepalma 2012b, 4, 
stress added).  
Finally, it is worth stressing that these two ways of getting discursive flexibility working 
for oil palm, that is the selective representation of oil palm, and the strategic choice of oil 
palm’s use-discourses, are neither mutually exclusive, nor static. They are not mutually 
exclusive because the same particular actor can strategically employ one way and the 
other, depending on the addressed interlocutor. For example, the Guatemalan 
GREPALMA conflated all three representations of oil pam as a crop, a tree and a 
commodity to make of it a ‘response-able’ phenomenon at the First Latin American 
Congress of Oil Palm Growers, but focuses strategically on oil palm as a crop with 
developmental benefits when addressing outraged villagers complaining about land-
grabbing and poor labor conditions in northern Guatemala (Alonso-Fradejas 2015). And 
both ways of making discursive flexibility work for oil palm are not static but contingent 
on actors’ choice to move from one way to another based on contextual changes over 
time. For instance, FEDEPALMA in Colombia moved from a an initial emphasis on oil 
palm as a food crop, taking distance from palm oil as a biofuel feedstock, to include the 
latter when export markets constrained and there was a need to expand domestic demand 




24 Interview with the Biofuels Coordinator of the Sustainable Development Vice-Ministry, Guatemalan Ministry of 
Energy and Mines, Guatemala City May 21 2008, and with the National Coordinator for Biofuels Development of the 
National Planning Department of the Colombian government, Bogota July 2 2008. 
25 Interview with Colombian FEDEPALMA’s Secretary general in Bogotá, September 20 2013 
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Synthesis: oil palm 
As we suggested at the beginning of this section, the material flexibility of oil palm is 
further endowed with meaning when its multiple representations and use-meanings are 
activated in a flexible fashion. But as we have tried to show, discursive flexibility as a 
resource to legitimate oil palm does not only shape in favorably social imaginaries and 
ideological-political standpoints. It also facilitates and mobilizes resources around the 
multiple uses of oil palm in materialist terms. We argued how discursive flexibility works 
in facilitating investors’ decision-making, access to markets, and differentiation in pursuit 
of competitive advantages. It also mobilizes resources of a different nature, ranging from 
favorable regulatory frameworks in the realms of production, circulation and 
consumption of oil palm’s multiple uses, to a wide variety of subsidies and fiscal 
exemptions under the umbrella of the food-, climate- and development-related purposes 
of the response-able phenomenon of oil palm.  
However, all these expected and unexpected outcomes of the discursive flexibility of oil 
palm are not automatic. They are strategically activated by the many and diverse 
“masters” of the discursive flexibility of oil palm. Those positioned favorably to oil palm 
include corporations in the oil palm value web (especially their CSR 
departments/discourses), (inter)national politicians and bureaucrats, the mass-media, and 
NGOs acting as sustainability gatekeepers. These favorable masters of oil palm’s 
discursive flexibility resort to different strategies for augmenting the legibility and 
legitimation of their narratives. Arguably, such strategies are often based more in 
enticement and self-disciplining mechanisms than in force and coercion. Among them, 
two are especially recurrent in the examples we have discussed above. The first one is the 
packaging of arguments and statements in a sort of ‘scientificity aura’, usually backed-up 
by IFIs, IGOs and/or the academia. The second one is the summoning of world historic 
patterns and trends of global societal concern.  
Jatropha as a ‘resource of dreams’ 
Like oil palm, the oilseed shrub jatropha has been promoted as a solution to problems of 
climate change, rural poverty and food insecurity and it has spread rapidly in the global 
South (GEXSI 2008). Jatropha does not have the high material flexibility of oil palm: it 
cannot be consumed as food, and can only be made into livestock feed if it is first 
detoxified. While proponents claim that producing jatropha oil could yield valuable co-
products, this has more potential to create dependency between multiple value chains 
than to offer a choice between them – a point to which we will return. Most recent 
interest has focused on jatropha as a source of liquid fuel (Nielsen et al. 2013).  
Despite this low material flexibility – indeed, at times because of it – jatropha has been 
the subject of multiple discourses that actors have used to encourage its spread (Figure 3). 
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We propose that while discursive flexibility has an amplifying effect on oil palm’s many 
uses, it has a compensating effect for jatropha’s relatively few. Selectively promoting and 
combining particular discourses has been a key strategy used to build and maintain 
momentum for jatropha activities. In the following sections we examine multiple claims 
about jatropha’s uses, purposes and representations and show how the fluidity of these 
claims has shaped its recent history. After reviewing a series of legitimating discourses 
that have been attached to jatropha we draw on interviews with key actors in Kenya to 
present three examples of discursive flexibility in action for jatropha.   
Figure 3: Jatropha’s discursive web 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
Legitimating discourses around jatropha 
Jatropha’s reputed ability to grow in harsh environments and its non-food character are 
two aspects of its materiality that have helped support legitimating discourses. Many of 
the positive claims about jatropha’s potential discussed below have been publicly 
challenged by NGOs (Friends of the Earth 2009, WWF 2009), and research in numerous 
countries has declared jatropha an overall failure (Slingerland and Schut 2014, Kant and 
Wu 2011). Nevertheless, some efforts to establish long-term projects continue (von 
Maltitz, Gasparatos, and Fabricius 2014, Nielsen et al. 2013). Our interest here is in how 
narratives of jatropha as a means to achieve clean energy, food security, environmental 




Jatropha provides clean energy 
Narratives about biofuels as clean, renewable energy have played a central role in 
enabling recent jatropha projects. Jatropha has benefited from the general view that 
biofuels can help mitigate climate change and enhance energy security (e.g. IPCC 2011) 
as well as the more specific claim that energy crops grown on ‘wastelands’ do not incur a 
significant carbon debt (Romijn 2011, Fargione, J. Hill, et al. 2008). Jatropha’s carbon 
balance has been favourably compared to that of fossil fuels as well as other biofuels, as 
long as it is not cultivated on former woodlands (Ndong et al. 2009, Bailis and Baka 
2010). The claim that jatropha has low land use impacts and resource input requirements 
has helped support the idea that it is more sustainable than other sources of biofuel. 
The materiality of jatropha affects the ways it has been represented as ‘clean energy for 
development.’ When crushed, jatropha seeds produce a crude oil that can be used locally 
in modified household lamps and some diesel engines. Further processing turns this oil 
into biodiesel that can be blended with fossil fuel diesel, making it suitable for a more 
diverse and geographically widespread set of applications. Discussions about jatropha’s 
merits and problems as an energy source tend to cluster around these two scales.  
At an international level, airplane test flights that ran partly on fuel derived from jatropha 
raised hopes that in time, jatropha oil could help reduce emissions from the aviation 
industry (Jha 2008). The potential to earn carbon credits through the Clean Development 
Mechanism has been part of the justification for some jatropha activities (van Rooijen 
2014), even though no biofuel projects have managed to obtain CDM certificates to date 
(Kim, Popp, and Prag 2013). Many projects have promoted jatropha as ‘clean energy for 
development’ at a local level, hoping it would provide off-grid power for small engines 
like irrigation pumps and grain mills (Achten et al. 2008). At a household level, jatropha 
has been said to produce less smoke than fuelwood or charcoal (for cooking) and 
kerosene (for lamps) (Brittaine and Lutaladio 2010) although others report more mixed 
results (Nielsen et al. 2013).  
Jatropha protects food security 
As mentioned, biofuels have been strongly attacked for threatening food security. While 
jatropha has faced criticism in this respect (e.g. Friends of the Earth 2010, 2009), a 
persistent legitimising discourse holds that jatropha can circumvent the ‘food versus fuel’ 
critique for two main reasons: 1) as an inedible crop, it would not cause food to be 
directly converted into fuel; and 2) due to its reputation for growing in dry and nutrient-
poor conditions, it was expected not to compete for land and water with food production 
(Francis, Edinger, and Becker 2005). Further, some claimed that growing jatropha would 
improve rural food security by: 3) providing a micro-climate that would help food crops 
grow where conditions would otherwise be too harsh; 4) protecting food crops from 
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animals when grown as a fence; 5) generating income that could be used to purchase 
food; and 6) providing a local energy source to improve food processing or storage 
(Brittaine and Lutaladio 2010, Achten et al. 2010). Together these arguments helped 
jatropha to assume ‘sustainable’ status among sources of biofuel. 
The perception that jatropha was more ethical than other energy crops for not 
compromising food security found its way into policy documents. Kenya’s draft biodiesel 
strategy of 2008 stated that in light of food security and poverty concerns, jatropha 
‘stands out among others as the primary non-food biodiesel crop that will be promoted 
for development in the bio-diesel industry’ (Government of Kenya 2008, 11). India’s 
policy similarly encouraged non-edible oilseed cultivation on ‘wastelands’, implicitly 
favouring jatropha (Baka 2013). As policy makers have increasingly shown awareness 
and concern about the potential negative impacts of agrofuel production on environments 
and livelihoods (Bailis and Baka 2011, Hunsberger et al. 2014), jatropha’s ‘sustainable’ 
potential continues to be reflected in biofuel policies. For example, as long as jatropha is 
not produced on ‘high-carbon land’ it will probably not violate the sustainability criteria 
of the 2009 EU Renewable Fuel Directive (Romijn 2011). 
Jatropha improves the environment 
Environmental discourses typically rest on representing jatropha as a tree rather than a 
crop or an energy source. As such, jatropha has been linked to a reforestation narrative 
(Valdés Rodríguez, Vázquez, and Muñoz Gamboa 2014) and included in tree-planting 
projects that aim to earn carbon credits (Slingerland and Schut 2014). Jatropha’s potential 
to mitigate climate change by storing carbon as it grows has been promoted in its own 
right and even referred to as ‘carbon farming’ (McGrath 2013). In addition to expanding 
or restoring forest cover, some claim that jatropha can reduce deforestation by providing 
pruned branches and seed hulls that can be burned instead of fuelwood or charcoal 
(Achten et al. 2010). These arguments about jatropha protecting and enhancing forests 
intersect with the issues of climate change mitigation and land use change already 
discussed.  
Jatropha has been credited with improving local environmental conditions in other ways: 
by controlling erosion, enriching soils, promoting water infiltration and reducing floods 
(Orwa et al. 2009, Green Africa Foundation 2008). These functions are sometimes 
framed as reclaiming or restoring ‘degraded’ lands (Openshaw 2000, Francis, Edinger, 
and Becker 2005). Jatropha has also been said to benefit wildlife, increasing ‘the habitat 
value of barren lands’ by attracting birds and animals (Francis, Edinger, and Becker 
2005, 21). However, opponents of a proposed plantation in Tana Delta, Kenya contested 
the project using a counter-discourse that portrayed jatropha as a threat to biodiversity 
(Krijtenburg and Evers 2014). 
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Jatropha alleviates poverty 
Jatropha has frequently been promoted as a ‘pro-poor’ crop (Brittaine and Lutaladio 
2010, Kuntashula, van der Horst, and Vermeylen 2014) based on expectations that it can 
provide income, extend energy access and reduce household expenses in remote rural 
areas. Some expect these benefits to be great enough to reduce rural-urban migration 
(Muok and Källbäck 2008, Green Africa Foundation 2008). Claims about jatropha’s 
ability to generate income and reduce poverty rest on optimistic assumptions about how 
quickly and abundantly it produces seeds (Achten et al. 2008), mirroring the high-
yielding, fast-growing narrative used to promote oil palm.  
In terms of income generation, jatropha plantations and processing facilities have been 
touted as new sources of rural employment while small-scale farmers have been told that 
jatropha is a reliable cash crop (Francis, Edinger, and Becker 2005, Green Africa 
Foundation 2008). For example, some initiatives focus on producing and selling ‘white’ 
soap made from jatropha oil (Favretto, Stringer, and Dougill 2012). Indirectly, jatropha is 
seen to enable income-generating activities such as adding value to other crops when it is 
used to provide energy in places without easy access to electricity.  
Jatropha has also been said to reduce poverty by substituting for resources that take time 
or money to acquire. Project proponents have argued that jatropha could improve 
education by providing cheaper fuel for household lamps than kerosene, helping children 
to study in the evenings (Hunsberger 2010). Experiments have been undertaken to make 
fertilizer or biogas from jatropha residues (Jongschaap et al. 2007). The plant’s fruit coats 
have been tested as a fuel for special stoves designed to burn sawdust; they were found to 
be suitable fuel for fast-cooking but not slow-cooking foods due to the stove’s design 
(Grimsby and Borgenvik 2013). ‘Black’ soap, made from jatropha residues, does not 
have a market but can reportedly reduce household expenses by substituting for 
purchased soap (Favretto, Stringer, and Dougill 2012). Jatropha can also perform 
important non-monetary functions. Various parts of the plant have medicinal uses and 
jatropha has also been used as a living fence and a grave marker (Heller 1996, Orwa et al. 
2009). However, van der Horst et al. (2014) argue that these traditional uses are not 
compatible with the scale needed for commercial production. 
Jatropha and material flexibility 
How flexible is jatropha in a material sense? It is not as ecologically flexible as many 
thought, producing few seeds under dry conditions (Pipal 2012, Nielsen et al. 2013). It 
cannot easily ‘flex’ in the sense of producers or investors deciding which of several 
products to make from it. In theory, jatropha oil can be used to produce soap if not 
energy, but large-scale soap production is not likely to emerge as an alternative value 
chain. Jatropha oil can be directed toward various energy applications, but the different 
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infrastructure needs of each pathway make it less likely that crude vegetable oil and 
biodiesel could be easily interchanged. Further, all energy uses would be affected by the 
same fluctuations in fossil fuel prices; thus, shifting from biodiesel for transport to crude 
oil as a kerosene substitute would probably not improve a seller’s position with respect to 
prices.  
Some suggest that selling byproducts is essential for jatropha energy production to be 
economically viable without subsidies (Pipal 2012) – but this type of multiple use should 
not be mistaken for flexibility. If economic success relies on having not one, but two or 
more value chains operating simultaneously, then what looks like diversification may in 
fact reflect a codependence that does not increase investors’ freedom to switch between 
end products. So far, this question remains hypothetical since markets for most of the 
anticipated co-products have not yet emerged (Vel 2014). Numerous jatropha initiatives 
have been discontinued because of unfavourable economic results (Messemaker 2008, 
Schoneveld 2011). Producers have found few ways to benefit from growing jatropha 
where value chains for both energy and by-products have failed to emerge. Ironically, 
jatropha’s low material flexibility positioned it as a ‘sustainable’ energy crop and 
accelerated its spread even as it placed risk on farmers and reduced options for investors.  
Jatropha and discursive flexibility 
Actors associated with jatropha have shown remarkable flexibility in producing and 
maintaining positive representations of the crop. Media coverage illustrates a wide range 
of coexisting views, ranging from ‘wonder shrub’ (Mutua 2007), ‘trophy tree’ (Obala 
2010), ‘savior’ (Cheboi 2008) and ‘resource of dreams’ (Thomas 2009), to ‘blunder crop’ 
(Lane 2009) and ‘biofuel gone bad’ (Time 2009). Meanwhile, researchers have expressed 
concerns over the financial, social and ecological risks of a large-scale experiment with 
jatropha, doubts that such a system would benefit farmers, skepticism about jatropha’s 
agronomic potential, and disbelief that jatropha can produce high enough quantities of oil 
to deliver promised benefits (Brittaine and Lutaladio 2010, Achten et al. 2007, 
Jongschaap et al. 2007, Kant and Wu 2011). The persistence of optimistic messages in 
the media (e.g. McGrath 2013) despite increasingly critical research findings suggests 
that neither of these perspectives has become dominant over time. 
Multiple discourses in Kenya 
This section examines the discourses and representations of jatropha offered by actors in 
Kenya, based on semi-structured interviews conducted with government, NGO, research, 
donor and private sector representatives in 2009 and 2013. For several years, peaking 
around 2007-9, jatropha activities spread quickly in the country. NGOs promoted 
jatropha to small-scale farmers; the government verbally endorsed jatropha and convened 
a multistakeholder process to inform a biofuel policy; and a few private companies 
20 
 
experimented with pilot plantations (Hunsberger 2010). By late 2013 these activities had 
largely dropped off. The biofuel policy was never finalized; research increasingly cast 
doubt on the economic and agronomic potential of current varieties of jatropha in the 
country (Pipal 2012, GTZ 2009, Iiyama et al. 2013); and proposals to establish large-
scale plantations had attracted opposition and negative media coverage (Krijtenburg and 
Evers 2014, Ross 2011). While some of those who had worked with jatropha several 
years before remained optimistic about its potential, most of the organizations and 
individuals who had advocated most strongly for jatropha projects in 2008-9 had since 
moved on to other pursuits.  
Below we draw on interviews conducted in 2009 during an intense period of expansion of 
jatropha projects largely funded by NGOs and international donors; policy development 
through a multi-stakeholder process; research; conflicting media stories; and growing 
international criticism of biofuels. At least two broad discourses of jatropha-led 
development in Kenya were articulated by those responsible for promoting and regulating 
such a process. One of these discourses advocated large-scale production to meet national 
objectives, drawing on themes of global climate change, fuel blending, foreign exchange 
and national poverty alleviation; another promoted small-scale cultivation to support 
household or farmer group objectives, drawing on themes of income generation, soil 
improvement, value addition and rural energy access. That jatropha could be portrayed as 
an instrument of both market-led national economic growth and community-led rural 
development helps explain why it appealed to actors with widely varying priorities. This 
multiplicity of discourse (Hilhorst 2001) created an opportunity for actors to strategically 
choose which discourses to activate in which situations, maintaining a creative flexibility 
to link discourses together or shift between them. 
Discursive flexibility in action 
The following examples from Kenya illustrate ways in which jatropha’s promoters took 
advantage of discursive flexibility. These can be grouped into two broad strategies: 
selectively representing jatropha’s end uses by deploying particular narratives while 
dissociating from others depending on the circumstances (Example 1); and conflating 
discourses that may in fact be contradictory (Examples 2 and 3).  
Example 1: Shifting representations of jatropha’s purpose 
Actors who changed how they presented jatropha’s purpose over time provide one 
example of discursive flexibility. One approach for growing jatropha in Kenya has been 
to use it as a living support for vanilla vines. Two of the NGO representatives 
interviewed initially promoted jatropha for this purpose, before interest in jatropha for 
biofuel became widespread. One described how a visiting trade delegation prompted the 
realization that vanilla was being grown as a profitable cash crop in Uganda but not in 
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western Kenya, which is only a short distance away and shares similar ecological 
conditions. The interviewee looked for a tree species that could act as a scaffold for 
vanilla, settling on jatropha. 
Vanilla did not grow well in this case. A private sector interviewee reported observing 
that where farmers had tried to grow vanilla and jatropha together, the vanilla vines were 
often dead or stunted while the jatropha was growing reasonably well. He encouraged 
these farmers to change their strategy and keep the jatropha, saying: ‘When I went to help 
these farmers sort out their vanilla-jatropha issue, and already they had planted it, put a 
lot of money, I told them instead of cutting, change your perception that you will get oil 
from this plant’ (stress added). An NGO representative described a similar shift in focus, 
stating that vanilla and jatropha could be decoupled and jatropha pursued for its own sake 
as an energy crop. 
This shift in strategy may appear to be an example of material flexibility, but we argue 
that it is not. Changing the stated reason to grow jatropha – from a support plant for 
another cash crop to a source of fuel – in the absence of processing capacity to produce 
energy appears to be a way of keeping farmers focused on the crop itself rather than on 
achieving successful results. This discursive tactic can be interpreted as an attempt to 
stem losses or deflect attention away from failure rather than as a choice producers could 
make between viable options. 
Example 2: Portraying different approaches as co-dependent 
Actors who presented large- and small-scale jatropha production as mutually dependent 
illustrate another form of discursive flexibility. Several interviewees stated that small- 
and large-scale approaches to growing jatropha would stimulate and mutually reinforce 
each other. Some described how large investments could build processing capacity, raise 
interest among potential buyers, and encourage more farmers to plant, thus building 
momentum that could in turn enable smaller projects. One researcher stated that large 
projects, if successful, could provide examples to motivate and support small initiatives. 
An NGO interviewee said this when asked what would be the best approach to growing 
jatropha in Kenya: 
I would say the hybrid. Whoever is able to plant more, let him plant because until we get a 
critical mass we cannot talk about jatropha as a business. When we get sizable quantity, 
that’s the time you will find probably investors bringing crushing machines, investing in an 
industry of trans-esterification and all that. But until we get to that point we cannot. At the 
same time, the villager there who can get a few kilos, extract oil, she can use them for local 
lighting, for the stove and all that. So to me, a hybrid would work very well. The 
commercial would assist, would be a link to the small-scale. 
These comments imply it was not only possible, but necessary that small- and large-scale 
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production should occur side by side. Two distinct approaches – articulated as 
commercial production led by the corporate, private sector and livelihood-oriented 
production for local use – were portrayed as not only compatible, but interdependent. 
Bundling together approaches in this way creates the impression that jatropha would 
necessarily achieve a wide range of goals simultaneously, a theme to which we will 
return shortly. 
Example 3: Blurring discourses 
In contrast to local production for local use, some actors promoted an outgrower role for 
small-scale producers. Typically, an outgrower arrangement involves small-scale farmers 
producing a crop on their own land under contract for a company that also operates a 
nucleus plantation. This means inserting small-scale producers into a commercial value 
chain where they would sell jatropha seeds into a centralized system for cash. Several 
interviewees drew parallels between a potential jatropha industry and existing systems of 
coffee, tea, sugar, and wheat production, presenting these as examples of how large and 
small farms could successfully coexist. 
The outgrower production model appears to offer a different kind of ‘win-win’ situation 
than the parallel advance of commercial and local production just described. Those who 
espoused the outgrower approach described it as able to achieve multiple benefits: 
ecologically, small plots would be preferable to large, monoculture plantations, while in 
terms of land tenure, farmers would keep the title to their own land – an arrangement that 
might appeal to smallholders while sparing investors from controversial negotiations over 
land (Pipal 2012). An outgrower system could (in theory) also achieve the economic 
objectives associated with large-scale, centralized production. In this way, some 
promoted a nucleus-outgrower production model as compatible with many goals of both 
large- and small-scale approaches. 
But enlisting small-scale farmers as outgrowers is not the same as producing energy to 
meet local needs. A donor expressed doubt that an outgrower approach would benefit 
small-scale farmers: 
No one wants to set up a plantation where he’ll have to spend so much money and receive 
so little yield. So what they’ll opt to do is have outgrowers grow it for them, and then 
they’ll source it from the outgrowers, and then put punitive measures to make sure they 
receive the maximum out of that. ...How long will it take for a farmer to pay off his debt? 
It’s a very risky thing. 
Actors who promoted the outgrower model portrayed jatropha as good for small farmers 
and good for the country while glossing over risks that small-scale farmers would likely 
face. The discursive flexibility here lies in portraying one production model (the 
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outgrower model) as achieving both large-scale and small-scale aspirations 
simultaneously without acknowledging that many of the unique benefits of small-scale 
production for local use would no longer occur. Fears that the outgrower model would 
place the risks of experimenting with jatropha on small-scale farmers have been borne out 
by experience in Zambia (German, Schoneveld, and Gumbo 2011). Promoting 
outgrowing as an ideal approach blends large- and small-scale discourses in a way that 
goes beyond the ‘mutually dependent’ position described above. Instead of two 
coexisting approaches that would each achieve a discrete set of goals, this position 
merges them into one that could supposedly do the same. Conflating multiple goals in 
this way makes the spread of jatropha harder to contest. 
Synthesis: jatropha  
Muys et al. (2014) observe that in sub-Saharan Africa, ‘no viable projects depending 
solely on jatropha are known’ (170), yet Nielsen et al. (2013) still conclude that despite 
many caveats and under certain conditions, ‘from a development perspective [jatropha] is 
great’ (56). Discursive flexibility has helped make the ‘jatropha project’ resilient in the 
face of failure. Vel (2014) argues that ‘brokers’ who act as mediators between groups of 
actors (such as investors, scientists and farmers) have played a major role in advancing 
jatropha projects by selectively communicating incomplete and poorly distributed 
information between these groups, as well as by ‘translating’ future expectations about 
jatropha into objects of trade in the present. In this way, jatropha has gained traction as a 
‘discursive commodity’ partly based on the idea that potentially attractive improvements 
– such as high-yielding varieties, seeds with higher oil content, and marketable co-
products – already exist (Vel 2014, 2816).    
Much of jatropha’s discursive flexibility comes from the idea that it can achieve different 
sets of goals depending which production model is used. The examples discussed above 
show actors in Kenya equating large-scale jatropha production with national and 
international goals, small-scale production for local use with household or community 
goals, and outgrower systems with ‘the best of both worlds.’ The idea that different 
outcomes (and benefits for different groups of people) can be achieved by choosing 
between several possible production models can also be understood as discursive 
flexibility. Unlike the decision of which product to make, the choice of production model 
must be made early on and involves considerable lock-in; it is not easy to change between 
large-scale plantations, small-scale production for local use or nucleus-outgrower 
arrangements once they are underway. Invoking the flexibility of different production 
models is therefore a discursive tactic. 
In the second example above, discursive flexibility takes the form of promoting jatropha 
as though it can achieve multiple objectives simultaneously through ‘mutually 
supporting’ commercial and local production strategies. Producing and marketing 
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products from several parts of the jatropha plant at once may seem to fit the flex crop 
ideal of ‘diversification… within a single crop sector’ (Borras et al. 2012, 851). Similarly, 
bundling together the benefits of mutually dependent small- and large-scale production 
sounds appealingly as though jatropha activities would be more stable and benefit more 
people than if a single strategy were pursued alone. But in both cases, the corollary to 
having two strategies ‘supporting’ each other is that both are threatened if either one 
experiences problems. If this is the case, then maintaining positive discourses becomes 
crucially important to those with an interest in promoting jatropha, even if this task 
becomes detached from delivering the benefits that the discourses promise. 
Jatropha’s low material flexibility appears to be a unique feature among agrofuel crops. 
Because few marketable products can be made from jatropha and markets for these 
products are not well developed, it is not easy to shift from one value chain to another 
(e.g. from biodiesel to soap). Producers face greater risks as a result. For crops such as oil 
palm, energy production adds another layer to a political economy that already includes 
food, feed, commercial or industrial products.  
Paradoxically, jatropha’s low material flexibility helped position it as a ‘sustainable’ 
energy source. In terms of its ability to attract donor, investor and government support, 
jatropha’s high discursive flexibility seems to have compensated for its low material 
flexibility. This is because actors have been able to portray jatropha as capable of 
simultaneously achieving national or ‘global’ goals related to economic growth and 
climate change, and ‘community’ goals related to livelihoods and local ecologies. 
Changing the stated reason for growing jatropha in the absence of a relevant value chain 
and conflating the expected outcomes of different production models provide examples of 
discursive flexibility at work. 
Concluding thoughts 
While materialist explanations of a flex crop’s multiple uses, and the flexing among 
them, are important to understanding the political economy of agriculture and 
contemporary agrarian change, they can be further enhanced by adding an analytical layer 
that probes the co-constitution of concealing, shifting, and interacting discourses. This 
analysis has also reinforced the political ecology perspective that, since discourses are 
highly influential in defining human-environment relationships and are never neutral, 
they and their tangible consequences deserve to be problematized. As Hall et al. argue, 
‘struggles over resources are, simultaneously, struggles over meaning’ (2012, 166). 
Even though oil palm is more flexible in material terms, similarities in the use of 
legitimating discourses around jatropha and oil palm are striking. While oil palm’s 
increasing multiple uses allow for a relatively high material flexibility, this has been 
underpinned by a strategic decision to discursively resignify the crop as a ‘response-able’ 
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phenomenon in the face of food-, energy/climate- and development-related problems. 
Therefore, materialist and ideational strategies converge as main reasons for oil palm 
expansion and growing popularity among corporate investors. For jatropha, proponents 
have emphasized that the crop cannot be turned into food or livestock feed, along with 
the perception that it can grow in harsh ecologies, to position it as a solution to the same 
suite of problems. Jatropha’s low material flexibility actually helped propel it by 
positioning it as a ‘sustainable’ energy source, while discursive flexibility helped make 
the ‘jatropha project’ resilient in the face of failure. Thus discursive flexibility has had a 
reinforcing effect on both oil palm and jatropha ‘projects.’  
We argue that discursive flexibility in action, first, generates synergies among 
legitimating discourses; that is, narratives in one realm (e.g. climate change mitigation) 
have spill-over effects in other realms (e.g. energy security and rural development). 
Second, it reconciles, even if temporarily, multiple and even apparently contradictory 
stakes of different actors within the flex crop value web (e.g. natural resource 
conservation and capital accumulation projects around natural resource exploitation). We 
believe this also occurs across geographical scales. Tsing (2005) points out that ‘global’ 
projects are most effectively constructed when they roll together objectives at different 
scales. For jatropha and oil palm, the bundling of ‘global’ discourses of climate change, 
national objectives regarding energy security and poverty alleviation, and local interest in 
value addition and rural economic opportunities has produced ‘thick collaboration’ 
between actors and across scales (Hunsberger 2014).  
This analysis makes a case for expanding the focus of ‘flex crop’ research to include 
attention to discursive flexibility – particularly how strategies to deploy multiple 
discourses or shift between them are used to justify, compensate for, shield or attack a 
flex crop (as embedded in a value web with far-reaching implications beyond farming), 
as well to channel benefits in specific directions. Key questions for further research 
include who has the power to mold and exercise discursive flexibility, in what ways, and 
who stands to benefit (and not benefit) from resulting decisions and outcomes. Finally, 
since the discursive and material co-constitution of the flex crops accumulation project 
‘occurs in and through struggles conducted by specific agents, typically involves the 
asymmetrical manipulation of power and knowledge and is liable to contestation and 
resistance’ (Jessop 2005, 146), a field of further inquiry is that of the power dynamics 
among actors within and around the flex crop’s value web, including those excluded 
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